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ABSTRACT: Argument has many functions. Argument can be used to articulate a 
position to oneself or to an audience; to show to oneself or others that a position is 
reasonable, in the sense that reasons can be given in favor of the position taken; as a tool 
of intellectual exploration or inquiry; and to help ‘locate’ areas of disagreement with or 
without the intention of addressing those areas. But clearly, one of the most obvious and 
important functions of argument is the rational resolution of disagreement. We often 
engage in argumentative discourse with the expectation that the end result will be a 
reasoned resolution of disagreement. In fact, part of the basic motivation of philosophical 
inquiry, and of the critical thinking movement as a specialized branch of philosophical 
inquiry, is that the careful construction and analysis of arguments can produce real 
progress in the adjudication of intellectual disputes—whether they be about such age-old 
philosophical controversies as the existence of freewill, the rationality of the fear of 
death, the desirability of embodied immortality, the nature and status of our epistemic 
claims or the nature of moral judgment, or about such contemporary social controversies 
as abortion, euthanasia, sexual morality, capital punishment, the war in Iraq or the current 
foreign policy goals of the United States  
It is easy to see why we have such high expectations for argument. In countless 
mundane cases of disagreement we employ argument with great success. We expect it, 
then, to pay dividends in the more controversial aspects of our social and intellectual lives 
as well. 
This optimistic picture of the role of argument in the rational resolution of 
disputes has not gone unchallenged. Twenty years ago Robert Fogelin suggested that in 
contexts of what he calls ‘deep disagreement’ argument fails to provide a means of 
rational dispute resolution: ‘there are disagreements, sometimes on important issues, 
which by their very nature, are not subject to rational resolution (through argument).’ 
This is because, according to Fogelin, contexts of deep disagreement ‘undercut the 
conditions essential to arguing.’  
Fogelin’s view is seemingly very pessimistic. It has the distinct advantage, 
however, of being at least partly true. However, the claim itself is vague and the 
argument he employs for it is underdeveloped. First, can we say anything about the kinds 
of contexts in which deep disagreement is likely to occur? We can gain some insight into 
what he has in mind by the example of deep disagreement to which he appeals: the 
controversy over affirmative action. This suggests that deep disagreement is likely to 
arise in contexts involving contemporary social controversies. But I argue that we must 
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include contexts of great abstraction, most notably philosophical contexts, since abstract 
philosophical argumentation seems every bit as prone to deep disagreement as contexts of 
contemporary social controversy. 
Second, can we flesh out his argument? Fogelin claims that it is the sharing of a 
vast, mostly inarticulable, background understanding of the world, or at least those 
aspects of it that are at issue in any given case of disagreement, that allows argument to 
cash in on its dialogical promise. And this shared understanding, which is and must be 
present in normal argumentative exchanges—its presence is what constitutes the 
exchange as a normal exchange—is just what is missing in contexts of deep 
disagreement. Thus interlocutors in contexts of deep disagreement not only fail to agree 
on what will count as settling the disagreement, they will most likely talk past one 
another, using vocabulary that seems shared but is not, since its significance comes from 
the vastly different understanding of the world the interlocutors bring to the table.  
How exactly is argument undermined in these non-normal contexts of deep 
disagreement? Fogelin says little about the details, including what he means by 
‘argument.’ We can begin to fill in the details, in particular what Fogelin means by 
‘normal argumentative exchanges’ and thereby what he has in mind when argumentative 
exchanges are non-normal, by appealing to Wright’s ‘interrogative’ picture of argument. 
Wright begins by articulating a traditional definition of the concept of an 
argument. An argument has two components: 1) reasons to believe a claim is true, usually 
referred to as premises; and 2) the claim for which the reasons serve as a justification, 
usually referred to as the conclusion. But Wright points out that as it stands this 
conception of argument is too formal and abstract to be of much help, since it is not at all 
clear how we are to select from the inexhaustible number of possible justificatory 
propositions. Wright’s suggestion is that what enables us to assemble the right kinds of 
reasons from amongst the vast amount of things we could say is a competent and mostly 
shared understanding of the issues in question. Such a shared understanding allows the 
interlocutors to understand the problem or the issue that has arisen; that is, they share a 
sense of the question that needs to be addressed. Wright calls this the ‘implicit question’. 
In addition, they share a sense of what would count as an answer to the implicit 
question—we expect them to have little trouble arriving at a short list of plausible, 
distinct (rival) answers. And we expect them to be able to identify some features of the 
situation that bear one way or another on the competition between those rival answers. 
Finally, we expect them to be able to make judgments about which rival answer is the 
best in light of those situational features. When the circumstances make it possible for 
arguers to settle on these issues, then it is not difficult to determine what counts as 
appropriate or relevant information: information is relevant as support if it has an impact 
on the list of plausible answers—rival conclusions—for the argument in question.  
 To determine what information needs to be made explicit, then, we need to at 
least be able to formulate an implicit question and provide a short list of serious rivals. 
What allows us to settle on these things is, as I have mentioned above, competence on the 
topic under discussion and a generally shared relevant understanding. When this 
competence and shared understanding fail to obtain, deep disagreement may occur, just 
because interlocutors in such situations will not be able to settle on an implicit question, 
what count as genuine rivals, or how information bears on the ranking of rivals relative to 
their competition. 
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Filling out a picture of argument that serves as a foundation for Fogelin’s claims 
and getting clearer on what kinds of arguments are prone to deep disagreement goes part 
way to defending his view. In addition, however, any adequate defense must respond to 
criticism. Lugg, for example, claims that argument need not require a pre-existing shared 
understanding of the issues at hand for it to cash in on its dialogical promise of rational 
dispute resolution; instead, it is by engaging in the practice of argument that such a 
shared understanding is forged. Thus, Fogelin's potentially devastating conclusion can be 
resisted. I argue that while it is obviously true that there are some cases of disagreement 
in which producing arguments for a view leads to a shared understanding, it does not 
follow that Lugg's claim holds for all cases of disagreement. For Lugg’s claim to be 
interesting it must be an empirical claim. If so, we must look to actual cases in order to 
determine its plausibility. A brief examination of the dispute between creationists and 
evolutionary theorists shows that Lugg’s claim is, at least in cases involving great 
controversy and great abstraction, overly optimistic. There are, then, some deep 
disagreements that are genuinely deep. Appealing to argument—in the sense just 
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